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Urbanization and the Wealth of Nations 
 





The proportion of a country's population living in urban areas is highly correlated with its 
level of income.  Urban areas offer economies of scale and richer market structures, and 
there is strong evidence that workers in urban areas are individually more productive, and 
earn  more,  than  rural  workers.    However,  rapid  urbanization  is  also  associated  with 
crowding, environmental degradation, and other impediments to productivity. Overall, we 
find no evidence that the level of urbanization affects the rate of economic growth. Our 
findings weaken the rationale for either encouraging or discouraging urbanization as part 




According to United Nations (UN) projections, more than half of the world’s population 
will live in urban areas by the end of 2008 (2). The continued increase in the share of the 
population  living  in  urban  areas  in  recent  decades  has  been  welcomed  by  many 
economists, who view urbanization as a positive achievement on the path toward wealth 
and prosperity. According to this view, urbanization underpins and enhances economic 
growth and therefore increases the wealth of nations in the long run (3).  
 
Urbanization is a complex phenomenon. Under favorable conditions, initially very small 
settlements can rapidly develop, first into small towns, and then cities as populations grow, 
and new economic and political structures emerge. Successful sectors within the city will 
attract further investment, generate increased demand for labor, and trigger migration to 
the city as a further mechanism of urban growth. With a better quality of life, however, 
cities may  become a major attractor for poor rural populations, leading to large urban 
unemployment, poverty, and, in many cases, also increased urban violence, congestion, 
and environmental degradation. The growth of urban areas has promoted concentrations of 
land, water, and air pollution (4), and is associated with the formation of large and rapidly 
growing slum populations in and around many major cities. According to the UN, more 
than 1 billion people, or about 14 percent of the total global population, lived in areas 
classified as slums in 2005 (5). These squalid settlements have come to be known for their   3/14 
hopelessness, their atmosphere of fear, and the social exclusion of their residents, and are 
hardly a symbol of economic progress. 
 
Governments have often undertaken active policies affecting the urbanization process. On 
the  one  hand,  policy  makers  can  inhibit  urbanization  by  providing  support  for  rural 
populations in the form of agricultural subsidies, or directly target rural populations by 
rural transfers or infrastructure projects. On the other hand, governments have historically 
often displayed large biases towards urban areas and urban populations in the developing 
world (6, 7) at the expense of the rural population. Due to the political pressure exerted by 
urban dwellers, central governments have encouraged urbanization by keeping agricultural 
prices low, by direct investment in urban industries, and by a more generous provision of 
public services such as health and education (8).   
 
In this article we show that there is no empirical evidence of a causal effect of the level of 
urban population share on the pace of economic growth. Although the agglomeration of 
diffuse populations into urban areas will generally increase output per capita, very large or 
rapidly growing urban areas can have offsetting negative effects through crowding and 
environmental degradation, and by overwhelming city administrations' capacities. Policies 
regarding urban development should weigh carefully the positive and negative spillovers 
of  urbanization,  without  a  presumption  that  urbanization  is  a  policy  for  promoting 
economic growth.   
 
The Effects of Urbanization 
The economics literature is replete with references to urbanization as a natural concomitant 
of modernization and industrialization (3, 9). Cities as locations of concentrated economic 
activities offer large and diversified labor pools and are in closer proximity to customers 
and suppliers, (10). Cities also offer increased opportunities for division of labor and make 
intra-industry specialization more likely (11). Firms may not only profit from horizontal 
and  vertical  spillovers,  but  are  also  able  to  respond  to  market  demand  changes  more 
effectively (12-15). Relatively cheaper transport combines with the proximity to customers 
and suppliers to reduce the costs of trade (16, 17). Moreover, by aggregating educated and   4/14 
creative people in one place, cities incubate new ideas and technologies and may lead to 
efficient growth by potentiating the full social returns to increased human capital (18, 19). 
While these models highlight the advantages of urbanization, the implied optimal level of 
urban population share is unclear. As urban areas become more densely populated, changes 
in urban population share may have no effect on productivity growth.  
   
Figure 1 shows the positive cross-country relationship between the level of income and the 
urban population share in 2000: the correlation between real income per capita and the 
fraction of the population in urban areas is 0.8. The theoretical arguments for urbanization 
as a source of productivity gains and the strong correlation between income and urban 
population share have been the foundation of a literature promoting urban growth as the 
path  toward  wealth  and  development  (20)  and  have  led  to  the  perception  of  a  strong, 
positive effect of urbanization on economic growth (3).  
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Figure 1 shows 180 countries with available income and urbanization data in 2000. The income variable is 
gross domestic product per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) (21). The percentage of people living in   5/14 
urban areas come from (22). These are the data we use throughout the paper. The main source of UN urban 
population share data are decennial censuses. The numbers rely on country-specific definitions, which are not 
always comparable across countries and not necessarily consistent across time (23, 24). Nevertheless, the 
picture looks virtually identical when geography-based data such as those generated by the Global Rural 
Urban Mapping Project (25) or alternative measures such as the urban/rural ratio are used (23). 
 
 
The Effect of Urban Population Share on Income Levels 
 
Although the cross-country scatter plot of income and urban population share is striking, it 
provides  little  insight  into  the  causal  relation  between  urban  population  share  and 
economic development.  At issue is whether urbanization promotes economic well-being. 
That is, would raising the level of urban population share in a country promote economic 
growth and a higher level of income? The relationship in Figure 1 could be due simply to 
an effect of the income level on the level of urban population share with no feedback from 
urban population share to the level of income. Alternatively, it could be due to a common 
factor that affects both urban population share and income, without either of them affecting 
the other. 
 
Two  previous  studies  have  failed  to  find  a  link  between  the  share  of  the  population 
urbanized and economic growth (26, 27). We investigate the question in more detail using 
a number of new approaches and argue that the result is robust. Our first approach is to 
investigate the  effects of urban population share on income levels across countries for 
1960-2000. The data set is configured into four 10-year intervals to limit the influence of 
short-term economic cycles, and to avoid reliance on interpolated urban population share 
data.    We  carry  out  a  Granger  causality  test  between  income  per  capita  and  urban 
population  share  (28).  Urban  population  share  is  said  to  “Granger-cause”  income  if, 
controlling for past income levels, past values of urban population share are predictive of 
future values of income. This is a low-threshold test insofar as it does not require direct 
evidence of  a structural, causal link from urban population share to income; it merely 
requires that urbanization has some predictive power for future income levels.  
   
The results of the Granger causality test are summarized in Table 1 below. We take real 
income per capita (29) as the dependent variable, and explain it with (10-year) lagged 
income as well as the (10-year) lagged level of urban population share. We also add fixed   6/14 
effects  that  control  for  country-specific  factors  that  are  constant  over  time,  and  time 
dummies to allow for a changing relationship over time. As shown in Table 1, once we 
control for the lagged income level, the lagged urban population share is not a statistically 
significant predictor of  future income levels. Knowledge of a  country’s level of urban 
population share does not appear to help us predict its future income level.  
 
 
The results of the Granger causality tests have to be interpreted with caution. Despite the 
fact that our specification incorporates time and country fixed effects (30), we may be 
excluding a number of other variables that affect economic growth, and thus obtain biased 
estimates. In addition, 10 years may be too short a time horizon for an economy to capture 
the benefits of urbanization (31).  
 
Table 1: Granger Causality Test 
  Dependent Variable 
 
Urban population share  
(Ten years previously) 
Log GDP per capita  
(Ten years previously) 
Observations 
Number of countries 








Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.  
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Country and time fixed effects are included in all specifications. Estimation results are based on 
the bias corrected LSDV estimator developed by Bruno (40). 
  
 
To address this issue we investigate whether the initial level of urban population share in 
1970  affects  the  rate  of  economic  growth  over  the  period  1970  to  2000.  In  this  cross 
sectional approach we have to control for other factors that may influence growth. Rather 
than specify our own ad hoc model of growth we use a specification based on the work of 
Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (32) (hereafter SDM) who examine 67 potential 
explanatory variables, not including urban population share, as possible explanations for 
economic growth, and identified those variables with the highest posterior probability (via 
Bayesian updating) given the evidence.    7/14 
Table 2: Long-Term Effects of Urban Population Share 
  Dependent Variable: Average 
Annual Growth 1970-2000 
Dependent Variable: Average 
Annual Growth 1970-2000 
  Full sample  Low Income Countries 
     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4) 
         
East Asia dummy variable
a)   1.609**   1.606**   5.075***   4.725* 
  (0.68)  (0.67)  (1.29)  (2.23) 
Primary schooling 1970   0.00363   0.00298   0.0438   0.0480 
  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.034)  (0.043) 
Investment price 1970  -0.00483***  -0.00486***  -0.00405***  -0.00414** 
  (0.0013)  (0.0013)  (0.0011)  (0.0015) 
Log (GDP) 1970  -1.669***  -1.560***  -3.424**  -2.529 
  (0.30)  (0.55)  (1.31)  (3.50) 
Fraction of area tropical  -0.787*  -0.766*  -0.473  -0.316 
  (0.42)  (0.44)  (1.68)  (1.90) 
Coastal density   0.000657*   0.000485   0.0120*   0.0123 
  (0.00038)  (0.00048)  (0.0060)  (0.0081) 
Fraction Confucian
b)   2.072*   2.249**     
  (1.08)  (1.12)     
Life expectancy 1970   0.181***   0.184***   0.0780   0.0666 
  (0.059)  (0.061)  (0.084)  (0.10) 
Africa dummy variable
a)  -0.0647  -0.0888  -0.0800  -0.183 
  (0.61)  (0.68)  (1.30)  (1.63) 
Urban population share 1970  -0.00950  -0.00664  -0.0379  0.312 
  (0.011)  (0.059)  (0.038)  (1.56) 
Urban Population Share 1970 
squared 
   0.000204 
(0.00041) 
   0.00141 
(0.0056) 
Urban Population Share x 
Log(GDP)1970 
  -0.00257 
(0.0094) 
  -0.0569 
(0.22) 
         
Constant
c   5.284**    4.608  20.84**  15.33 
  (2.36)  (3.54)  (8.82)  (21.6) 
p-value for F-Test of joint  
significance of urban share terms 
   0.857     0.794 
         
Sample  All countries  All countries  Low income  Low income 
Observations  86  86  24  24 
R-squared  0.65  0.65  0.73  0.74 
Notes: 
a) The Africa and East Asia Dummy Variables are indicators that equal 1 if the country is in respective region, and 0 
otherwise. The inclusion of these indicators is based on the hypothesis that all countries in a geographic area share 
some region-specific characteristics that affect economic growth. 
b) Following Barro (33), Fraction Confucian is the proportion of the population indicating Confucianism as primary 
religion. 
c) The constant represents the intercept of the fitted regression line. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
In column 1 of Table 2, we show the results for a model with their nine best predictors, 
plus the initial fraction of the population living in urban areas. We estimate a negative, but 
statistically insignificant, effect of urban population share. In column 2, we allow for a   8/14 
non-linear relationship between income and urban population share (using a squared term) 
and  for  the  optimal  level  of  urbanization  to  depend  on  the  level  of  income  (using  an 
interaction term between income and urban population share). The results in column 2 are 
similar to those in column 1: none of the terms that include urban population share have a 
statistically significant effect on future economic growth, either individually or jointly.  
 
We wish to assess the robustness of these growth regression results. There are two factors 
that might change the results. First, low-income countries may be different from other 
countries; and second, changing the set of covariates used in the growth regression may 
change the estimated effect of urban population share. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 we 
repeat the growth regression exercise for low-income countries as defined by the World 
Bank. This gives somewhat different estimates, and has less precision since the sample size 
is smaller, but again we find no effect of the level of urban population share on economic 
growth.  
 
In Table 3a we report the coefficient of urban population share for a number of regressions 
with  different  sets  of  covariates.  We  start  with  just  urban  population  share  and  initial 
income, a specification similar to that used in Table 1, but now without country fixed 
effects. We then examine the effect of adding sequentially the 5, 9, and 16 covariates that 
provide the best prediction of economic growth as found by SDM (32). In none of these 
regressions is urban population share statistically significant. In Table 3b we repeat the 
exercise for low- and middle-income countries and find the same lack of significance. 
 
Table 3a: Robustness Checks Table: Full Sample 
  Dependent Variable: Average Annual Growth 1970-2000 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Model  Lagged GDP Only  SDM 5  SDM 9    SDM 16 
         
Urban population share 
1970 
  0.00917   0.00621  -0.0130  -0.0105 
  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.013) 
         
Observations   78    78   78   78 
R-squared   0.04   0.55   0.68   0.74 
         
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3b 
Robustness Checks Table: Low- and Middle-Income Countries Only 
  Dependent Variable: Average Annual Growth 1970-2000 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Model  Lagged GDP Only  SDM 5  SDM 9   SDM 16 
         
Urban population share 
1970 
 0.00179  -0.0144  -0.0231   -0.0266 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.020) 
         
Observations  55  55  55  55 
R-squared   0.00   0.52   0.66   0.73 
         
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Overall, our results imply that countries with a higher degree of initial urban population 
share do not experience any faster or slower economic growth than countries with a low 
degree of initial urban population share. Moreover, this result appears quite robust with 
respect to the specification of the growth model. Taken together, none of our empirical 
tests provide support for the view that urban population share has a causal effect on the 
level of income. Although urbanization is part of the process of economic development, it 
does not appear to have an independent influence on economic growth (33).  
 
 
Different Types of Urbanization 
Understanding  the  process  of  rural-to-urban  migration  is  central  to  understanding  the 
effects of urbanization. There are several distinct channels through which urbanization can 
occur. The first involves the movement of people from rural to urban areas. Empirically, 
migration is estimated to contribute on average between 40 and 50 percent of total urban 
population  growth  (34,  35).    Second,  the  rate  of  natural  population  increase  may  be 
different in urban and rural areas, due to differences in birth and death rates.  Birth rates 
are usually lower in urban than rural settings, but mortality rates are often lower as well.  
The third important channel is the reclassification of rural settlements as urban as a result 
of  rural  population  growth  and  increasing  population  density;  a  person  can  become 
“urbanized” while standing still. 
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Although  migration  can  be  triggered  by  increased  demand  for  labor  in  urban  areas, 
blooming economies are not the only cause of urban migration. Political instability within 
countries has led to major refugee flows toward cities like Kinshasa (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo) and Karachi (Pakistan). Natural disasters, such as extended droughts and 
floods, have destroyed the economic basis of rural life in several regions in the developing 
world  and  induced  major  population  flows  toward  the  cities  in  countries  like  Angola, 
Ethiopia,  and  Mauritania  (36).  Even  in  the  absence  of  natural  disasters,  economic 
conditions  in  the  countryside  –  sometimes  brought  about  by  policies  that  favor  city 
dwellers – can push rural residents to cities that, in the long run, offer them little in the way 
of  economic  sustenance.  In  such  cases,  cities  may  grow  rapidly  in  population  without 
being economic "success stories".  
 
One  possible  explanation  for  the  absence  of  an  empirical  link  running  from  urban 
population share to income per capita lies in the different types of urbanization observed 
across countries or continents.  Although the share of the population living in urban areas 
has risen from slightly below 20% to a level around 36% in both Asia and Africa between 
1960 and 2000 (Figure 2), per capita income has increased 340% in Asia compared with 
only 50% in Africa. If the initial level of urbanization were the key factor in economic 
growth we would have expected both regions to grow at about the same rate since they had 
about the same urban population share. If we thought that urban population share simply 
follows the level of income, Asia should have urbanized much more quickly than Africa 
given its superior growth performance – but again this was not observed. Rather, it appears 
that urbanization in Asia has been driven mostly by industrialization and a plethora of job 
opportunities in urban areas (37), whereas urbanization in Africa seems to be more the 
result of population pressure, civil conflict, and changing political regimes (24) as well as 
ethnic tensions and a momentum effect (38) .  
 
The fact that rapid urbanization has gone hand in hand with economic growth in Asia, 
while  proceeding  just  as  rapidly  but  without  growth  in  Africa,  is  perhaps  surprising. 
However, it is a common pattern that, over long periods of time, development indicators 
can move in quite different directions (31). Development is a multifaceted process and   11/14 
economic growth, or the absence thereof, is not a strong indicator of progress in other 
dimensions of development.     
 



















































































Urban share in Asia
Urban share in Africa
Income per capita Asia




Although the share of the total population living in urban areas seems to have little effect 
on  economic  growth,  it  may  be  that  other  measures  of  urban  composition  do  matter. 
Primacy,  the  portion  of  the  urban  population  living  in  the  largest  city,  or  urban 
concentration, the proportion of urban dwellers living in large cities, may affect economic 
growth, though the size of these effects appears to be highly non-linear (26, 27). Primacy 
and  urban  concentration  are  measures  of  the  distribution  of  the  urbanized  population 
between small and large cities, and in practice have a very low correlation with the level of 
urban population share of the overall population that we investigate here. 
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The Bottom Line 
Urban development is important; with a majority of the world population living in urban 
areas, well-functioning cities will be one of the key factors in the ongoing battle against 
poverty (39). However, it appears that urbanization is more an indicator than an instrument 
of  economic  development.  Our  findings  imply  that  policies  specifically  aimed  at 
accelerating, or retarding, urbanization are unlikely to speed up economic development. 
Even though regional urban areas and success stories like the Silicon Valley or Bangalore 
are  key  drivers  of  economic  growth,  the  notion  that  a  larger  fraction  of  a  country’s 
population living in urban areas improves economic performance does not seem to have 
empirical support. Policy-makers who hope to increase the long-term economic growth of 
their countries by supporting, or inhibiting, urbanization, are likely to miss their target.  
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